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CRIMINAL LAW 
IMPLEMENTING THE OBLIGATION OF ADVOCACY IN REVIEW OF 
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 
LARRY I. PALMER* 
It is generally assumed that there is some rela-
tionship between the United States Supreme 
Court's "right to counsel" cases and the expanded 
role of appellate courts in criminal law decision-
making.1 For instance, the Court's decision requir-
ing appointed counsel on appeal to file a brief before 
he seeks withdrawal on the grounds that the appeal 
is "without merit", A11ders v. California;2 has led 
to two kinds of inquiry because of this assumption. 
Does Anders define, albeit inadequately, court-
appointed appellate counsel's obligation to his 
indigent client?3 Or is A11ders an expression of the 
Court's previous decisions requiring appointed 
counsel at trial4 and on the :first appeal as of right?5 
As to an emerging issue such as when an individual 
is entitled to appointed counsel on a discretionary 
appeal, 6 the lines of inquiry generated by the as-
sumption lead to more difficult questions about 
the functional relationship of appellate courts and 
the wide-spread presence of counsel in the criminal 
process.7 
Despite this widely held assumption, few aca-
demic resources have been expended on systematic 
analyses of the constitutional doctrines dealing with 
counsel and the role of reviewS in the criminal 
*Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers-Camden, 
A.B. Harvard, 1966; LL.B. Yale, 1969. 
I would like to express my appreciation to Mary 
Sibley, a third year student at the Rutgers-Camden 
Law School, for her research assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article. 
I would also like to acknowledge the aid of my col-
league Professor Tom J. Farer, who was kind enough to 
read a draft of this paper. 1 H. PACKER, LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 237 (1968) (hereinafter cited as PACKER, Lmrrs]. 
2 386 u.s. 738 (1967). 
3 Herman, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y.U.L. 
REv. 701 (1973). 
~Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
6 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
6 Ross v. Moffitt, 483 F. 2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. 
granted, 415 U.S. 909, (1974). 
7 See Ross v. Moffitt, 42 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. April 
30, 1974) (oral argument). 
8 For a pre-Gideon analysis of the counsel problem see 
Kamisar, Tile Riglzt to Counsel and tile Fourteenth 
Amemlmetzt: A Dialogue on tlze Most Pervasive Riglzt of 
tlze Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1962). 
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process. When did the Court begin exploring the 
possible roles that appointed counsel might play in 
the appeals process? Anders is, as will be demon-
strated, one such instance where the Justices were 
struggling explicitly with the implementations of 
its growing body of constitutional doctrines of 
counsel and review. There have been few discus-
sions of whether in fact, from the viewpoints of 
various Justices, the problem of the right to ap-
pointed counsel on a discretionary appeal, ought 
to be viewed as an extension of the doctrines deal-
ing with access to review, the doctrines of counsel 
at trial, or a combination of the doctrines. The lack 
of such systematic analyses of these cases with a 
variety of doctrinal bases is unfortunate at a time 
of general debate over judicial administration. Such 
debate has led to judicial criticism of the per-
formance of counsel in the criminal process and 
suggestions for reform. 9 
The impetus for the systematic analysis pre-
sented in this article is the recurrence of constitu-
tional issues surrounding counsel in the criminal 
process10 and the current widespread debate over 
judical administration. Part I proposes an inte-
grated theory of the constitutional decisions dealing 
with the right to counsel and the review of criminal 
convictions. Such an integration assumes that vari-
ous decision-makers in criminal law perform differ-
ent functions. The corollary of this assumption is 
that the difference in function should lead to differ-
ent constitutional analyses by appellate courts. To 
develop an integrated theory, it will be argued that 
those cases dealing directly with the function of 
counsel and appellate courts in criminal law must 
be analyzed in terms of constitutional principles. 
The purpose of such an integrated theory is to 
'o See, e.g., Burger, Tlze Special SkiUs of Advocacy: 
Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates 
Essential to Our System of Jtestice'l 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 
227 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Burger, Special Skills]; 
Bazelon, Tlze Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. 
em. L. REv. 1 (1973). 
1° See, e g., Fuller v. Oregon, 96 Ore. 457, 504 P.2d 
1393, cert. gra1Jted, 414 U.S. 1111, afi'd, _U.S._, 94 
S. Ct. 2116 (1974). 
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delineate some of those unique features of modern 
criminal adjudication that are viewed as "funda-
mental". Such a demarcation will make more visi-
ble the part criminal adjudication plays in the 
"crisis of the courts". 
Part II uses the integrated constitutional theory 
as a tool for evaluating or assessing the many pro-
posals for reforming courts. To illustrate the utility 
of the analysis, two current problems will be dis-
cussed in terms of the integrated analysis developed 
in Part I. First, proposals to limit the availability 
of one kind of review of a criminal conviction-fed-
eral habeas corpus-will be discussed. In most dis-
cussions these proposals have been viewed as the 
problem of determining when criminal litigation 
has become final. Second, a variety of proposals to 
expedite appellate criminal appeals will be dis-
cussed. These proposals have been viewed as 
addressing the problem of "speedy disposition" of 
criminal appeals. With an integrated constitutional 
theory, however, both problems can be analyzed 
and resolved in terms of allocating the resources of 
appellate courts and counsel in criminal law deci-
sion-making. 
Whether the proposed integrated constitutional 
theory or some other is adopted, several new per-
spectives are generated by an integrated approach. 
While some avenues of reform are foreclosed be-
cause of the constitutional nature of the principle 
jeopardized by reform, many other avenues are 
still open. Despite the constitutional overlay on 
criminal law decision-making in recent years, state 
bodies have more latitude to modify the adminis-
tration of their criminal law than has been gen-
erally assumed. Finally, legal scholars must start 
to examine a new legal institution created by con-
stitutional adjudication-counsel for the accused 
and the convicted in the criminal process. Under 
an integrated approach, the cases dealing with 
counsel and review in criminal law should no longer 
be seen solely as constitutional opportunities to 
protect the "indigent". 
I. ThE VARIETIES OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND 
ACCESS TO REVIEW 
The proposed integrated theory proceeds from 
the premise that judges, even in their constitutional 
decision-making, decide cases in terms of certain 
principles and rules.11 The proposition is congruent 
with the recent analysis suggesting that there are 
11 See generaUy Dworkin, A Model of Rules, 35 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 14 (1967). 
similarities between judicial reasoning in common 
law and constitutional casesP For instance, 
judges do not generally develop basic "policies" 
of law in deciding common law and constitutional 
disputesP On the other hand, when the rule of law 
employed to decide a common law or constitutional 
case is justified by a "principle" of law, the scope 
of review is more searching than when the rule is 
justified by a policy of law.14 While drawing the 
distinction between "principles," "rules," and 
"policies" is considerably more difficult in consti-
tutional law than in common law doctrines,15 the 
method of analysis based on this distinction helps 
to illuminate the function of review in the criminal 
process. 
Since judges often differ when any "funda-
mental" issue of law is decided, it is hardly sur-
prising that the Justices have had many differences 
in recent constitutional cases dealing with the state 
criminal process. Under the proposed theory it is 
possible to characterize the nature of these differ-
ences in terms of divergent views as to what prin-
ciples or rules should govern the case before the 
Court. Given the rapidity of the constitutionaliza-
tion of the criminal process, Justices often agree 
with the result or the new rule developed in the 
case but feel compelled to write concurring opin-
ions.16 Once the differences among the Justices have 
been identified, the proposed theory provides a 
method of resolving these conflicts of principles and 
rules, at least in the area of the right to counsel and 
review of criminal convictions. Essentially the 
method of analysis requires that cases that are 
identified as containing clear conflicts of principles 
should be analyzed as attempts to create new prin-
ciples. If the major import of the case is to illumi-
nate a conflict of principles among the Justices, 
these decisions should not be analyzed as contain-
ing particular constitutional rules that must be 
followed in solving the problems of judicial ad-
ministration. Rather these decisions are more use-
fully viewed as stating constitutional policies of 
fair adjudication that are developed by a particular 
kind of appellate court, the Supreme Court of the 
United States. The cases dealing with review of 
12 See generally Wellington, Comm011 Law Rules a1111 
Constitutional Double Sta1111ards: Some Notes on Adjudi-
cation, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973). 
u I d. at 267. 
U[d. at 269. 
15 I d. 
16 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 
(1972). 
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criminal convictions17 and the role of appointed 
counsel on appeal18 are examples of basic policy de-
cisions by the Court without a clear articulation of 
of underlying constitutional principle. 
The theory will help to explain why the overall 
impact of the cases dealing with the right to counsel 
and review of criminal convictions is an expanded 
role for appellate courts in criminal law decision-
making. With such an explanation it becomes ap-
parent that criminal law decision-making may be 
an exception to the general rule that appellate 
courts do not develop basic legal policies.l 9 By 
creating more issues for judicial resolution, the 
Supreme Court has not usurped the legislative role, 
rather the Court's decisions have realigned the in-
stitutional competences of the courts, the legisla-
ture, and other decision-makers. As an explanation 
or rationalization of the new role for appellate 
courts, the integrated theory becomes useful to 
those resolving the problems of judicial administra-
tion. 
The integrated approach differs significantly 
from recent discussions of the right to counsel in 
the criminal process.20 There has been a tendency 
to treat the right to counsel cases as one legal doc-
trine to be expanded or constricted in subsequent 
decisions. A given decision on the right to counsel 
is thus viewed as indicative of a broad trend in 
constitutional decision-making. Following this line 
of analysis, one expects a decision holding that an 
individual is entitled to counsel at a deferred sen-
tencing proceeding21 to signal the the development 
of a constitutional theory of the correctional proc-
ess by the Court.22 
A second type of commentary on right to counsel 
cases assumes that the instrumental view of law is 
the standard of evaluating the Court's decisions.23 
17Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); 
Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
18 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Ents-
minger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
u Cf. Wellington, Comnum Law Rules and Constitu-
tional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 
83 YALE L.J. 221 267 (1973). 
20 See, e.g., Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the 
Relzabilitative Ideal: The View from Mempa v. Rltay, 47 
TEx. L. REv. 1 (1968); Van Dyke, Parole Revocation 
Hearings in California: The Right to Counsel, 59 CAI..IF. 
L. REv. 1215 (1971). 
21 Mempa. v. Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 (1967). 
22 See Cohen, Sentencing, Probation and the Rehabili-
tative Ideal: Tire View from Mempa v. Rltay, 47 TEx. L. 
REv. 1, 10 n.44 (1968). 
23 Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings in Cali-
fornia: Tlze Right to Counsel, 59 CAI..IF. L. REv. 1215 
The important point of analysis in this type of 
commentary is to determine how individuals will 
respond to a particular decision to grant or with-
hold counsel. Thus, in discussing whether counsel 
is required at parole revocation hearings, one com-
mentator suggests that the courts' subsequent re-
fusal to hold that a parolee is per se entitled to 
counsel at a revocation hearing signals the end of 
due process.2-l 
The integrated theory proposes a method of 
criticism that follows a different line of inquiry. As 
to either decision involving the right to counsel, 
the integrated analysis seeks first to ascertain if 
there is a particular principle dealing with counsel 
in the decisions. After determining what the prin-
ciple is, the next line of inquiry is whether the artic-
ulated principle is consistent with the principle 
previously articulated in the case law. At a third 
level of inquiry, one _x;night ask if the particular 
rule established in the case is in conflict with any 
principle articulated in the cases. For example, 
both the decision requiring counsel in all deferred 
probation revocation proceedings and the de-
cision requiring counsel to be provided in proba-
tion proceedings on a case by case analysis are 
consistent with the previously articulated princi-
ples requiring counsel in the criminal process. 
While the integrated theory is a legal theory of 
due process in criminal law decision-making, the 
theory should not be confused with Professor 
Packer's Due Process Model. 25 In explaining the 
impact of Gidetm v. W ainwrighl,28 which requires 
the states to provide counsel for those accused of a 
felony, Packer asserts that the opinion "will remain 
for a long time the watershed decision in the evolu-
tion of the criminal process." 27 Such a statement 
creates the impression that Gidem remains the 
analytical starting point for discussions of lawyers 
in the criminal process. The proposed theory ac-
cepts Professor Packer's notions that the wide-
spread presence of lawyers has significantly modi-
fied the criminal process. However,, the proposed 
analysis will start with the principle of constitu-
tional law involved in the Gidetm decision. Along 
(1971). But see Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist 
Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972). 
u Van Dyke, supra at 1217. This same co=entator 
suggested that Eldridge Cleaver was forced to remain 
in "exile" by the failure of the Court to require pro-
cedural safeguards, including the right to counsel, at 
parole revocation hearings. 
25 PACKER, LIMITS. 
26 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
27 PACKER, LIMITS at 237. 
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with Professor Packer's analysis, the integrated 
theory recognizes that a constitutional requirement 
of counsel in state criminal processes creates a host 
of new legal issues.28 The integrated legal theory is 
in direct conflict with the notion that to use either 
Due Process or Crime Control Models is the 
method of resolving these new issues. 
Reduced to its essentials, the integrated theory 
of counsel and review cases focuses on three prin-
ciples. The Court has explicitly recognized that an 
individual accused of a crime is required to have a 
lawyer at trial in order to increase the accused's 
opportunity to defend against a criminal charge. 
This first principle will be referred to as the princi-
ple of an opportunity to defend against the depriva-
tion of liberty. Second, the Court has implicitly 
developed a principle that requires that convicted 
persons have an opportunity to have another body 
determine if the status of "convicted person" is 
legitimate. This principle, referred to as the op-
portunity to litigate the legitimacy of state control, 
is implicit only because the issue of whether review 
of a criminal conviction is required has not been 
raised in recent times.29 To relate the :first two 
28 Packer raises questions about GideotJ, some of which 
have been subsequently answered by the Court: 
In what kinds of criminal prosecutions does the 
right to assigned counsel apply-in "serious" 
offenses only? If so, what are the criteria of "seri-
ousness"? When does the right to counsel begin 
and end? Are the limits the same for assigned 
counsel as for privately retained counsel? Loom-
ing up behind these questions are even more por-
tentous ones. Does the effective assistance of 
counsel require that the state must provide finan-
cial compensation for the lawyers who serve? 
Must provision be made for other expenses of an 
effective defense? ld. 
29 Despite the relatively recent introduction of ap-
pellate review in the United States, a modem constitu-
tional theory without a concept of review of a criminal 
conviction is now unthinkable on several counts. Prag-
matically speaking, the Court's own opinions have 
created more appellate issues for the lawyers now 
constitutionally required to be in the criminal process. 
Were there no state criminal appeals, there would be 
greater incentives for these lawyers to cast all appellate 
issues in terms of constitutional law in order to gain 
federal review. Out of self-interest or a concern for 
minimizing federal interference with the state criminal 
processes, the Court is uulikely to allow states the 
option of eliminating all state review of criminal con-
VICtions. See generally L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS 
(1939); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal 
Haheas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HA'Rv. L. REv. 
441 (f963); Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Clzanging Court: A Model for a New Equal 
Protectiot~, 86 HA'Rv. L. REv. 1 (1972). While it ap-
pears unlikely at present that any state legislature 
would seriously contemplate a policy of no criminal 
appeals, it is a theoretical possibility under conventional 
analyses in the states' attempt to "ration justice". Cf. 
Hazard, Rationing Justice, 8 J. LAW & EcoNOMICS 
(1965). 
principles in an integrated approach, a third prin-
ciple should be recognized. That p_rinciple is the 
obligation of appellate counsel to use the review 
procedures available to argue that the conviction is 
illegal. ThiS principle will be called the obligation 
of advocacy. In furtherance of the principle, the 
theory of illegality argued to the appellate court 
should be based on the theory of defense employed 
by counsel to defend the accused at trial. None of 
these three principles necessarily explains all of the 
cases on review and counsel since many of these 
cases contain rules rather than principles. R,ather, 
these principles will be used to demonstrate that 
these cases can be understood as part of an in-
tegrated modem theory of criminal Iaw decision-
making. Finally, it is not contended that particular 
Justices have used this particular integrated theory 
in their decisions. It is only contended that they 
could in future decisions or that others-state 
appellate courts, court administrators, and the 
providers of counsel-could use the analysis to re-
solve certain problems of judicial administration. 
A. The Opportunity to Defend Against 
the Deprivation of Liberty 
A decade after Gideon, it is still important to em-
phasize that its doctrinal foundation is found in a 
variety of theories of due process. The primary 
issue resolved in Gideon is whether the state is 
obligated to provide trial counsel for an individual 
accused of a "serious crime". Or put another way, 
the question is whether some fundamental notion 
of "fairness" requires that those accused of a crime 
be assisted by counsel. While a unanimous Court 
answered the question by placing the obligation of 
providing counsel on the states, the variety of the-
ories of due process available to arrive at the result 
is amply demonstrated by the three concurring 
opinions.80 All of the divergent methods of reason-
ing to the same result are functions of the particu-
lar Justice's theory of due process. Thus, each 
opinion contains an explicit theory of the Supreme 
Court's review function in criminal law. 
A tendency of some courts and commentators to 
merge discussions of Gide01t with cases dealing ex-
plicitly with equal protection notions:n shifts the 
ao 372 U.S. at 345 (Dou~las, J., concurring); id. at 
347 (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 349 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
31 Justice Clark does this explicitly in Anders when he 
cites Gideon as one of the principles to which he ad-
heres. 386 U.S. 738, 742 (1967). Apparently the more 
accepted "equal protection" analysis used in Anders' 
companion, Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967), 
allows the dissenters in Anders to concur in Entsminger. 
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goal of Gideon to equalizing the plights of the "in-
digent" and "non-indigent" defendant. But such 
interpretations ignore the scrupulous avoidance of 
any mention of equal protection in the Court's 
opinion.32 In addition, such discussions have con-
fused the due process issue in Gide01t with a related 
secondary issue involving counsel. Admittedly, 
when the authoritative state decision-making body 
has decided that retained counsel is allowed, the 
state may be required to. furnish counsel to the 
"indigent". And such a question does raise an issue 
of "equal protection" under some analyses.33 Some 
commentators suggest thatfor "pragmatic reasons" 
the due process and. equal protection grounds of 
decisions may become unimportant in constitu-
tional decision-making.34 However, in determining 
which matters are fundamental principles of mod-
em criminal law decision-making, the due process-
equal protection dichotomy is important to under-
standing the divergence and convergence of the 
variety of theories utilized in deciding cases. 
The recent extension of Gide01t to less serious 
crimes in Argersinger v. Hamlin35 is illustrative of 
both the convergence as to result but divergence as 
to the underlying theory of due process. Once again 
a unanimous Court, but with three concurring 
opinions, held that a state must provide counsel 
whenever its processes of adjudication result in an 
actual deprivation of liberty.36 The "rule" of Ar-
gersinger is workable from a reviewing court's per-
spective since an allegation of lack of counsel at 
trial requires few judicial resources for its resolu-
386 U.S. at 752 (Stewart, Black, and Harlan, con-
curring). See discussion in text pp. 25-27. See also 
Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971), 
ajf'd on other groumJs, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). Cj. Birzon, 
Kasanof, Forma, The Right to Counsel and Indigent 
Accused in Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction in New York 
State,14 BUFFALO L. REv. 428, 432 {1965); Kamisar, 
Equal Justice in the Gatelwuses and Mansions of Ameri-
can Criminal Procedure in CluMINAL JusTICE IN OUR 
TIME 1, 64-81 (1965). 
32 Israel, Gideon v. W aitlwright: Tile "Art" of Over-
rulit~g, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 211, 245-48. 
33 Cf. Wainwright v. Cottle, 477 F. 2d 269 (5th Cir.), 
judgment vacated, 414 U.S. 895 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
uSee, e.g., Gunther, Forward: In Searclz of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal 
Protection, 86 HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 41-43 (1972). 
35407 u.s. 25 (1972). 
as One justification for the Court's peculiar rule is 
that it defines the limits of the si.'!:th amendment's 
requirement of counsel in "criminal prosecutions". 
Such a definitional approach explains, for instance, why 
the sixth amendment-fourteenth amendment jury 
trial requirement is made operative by the possibility 
of sb: months incarceration, Baldwin v. New York, 399 
U.S. 66 (1970), but the counsel requirement depends on 
the actual result of trial and sentence. 
tion. However, from a trial court's perspective, the 
actual rule articulated will lead to several obvious 
problems in administration since .it requires a trial 
judge to make a prosp~tive judgment as to what 
the sentence will be in a relatively minor crime.37 
But focusing on the problems of implementing the 
Argersi1tger rule ignores its more significant impact 
on unresolved problems of constitutionally requir-
ing appointed lawyers as part of criminal law de-
cision-making. Besides .reaffirming the principle of 
Gideon as the opportunit;y. to defend against a 
criminal charge, each opinion addresses the prob-
lem of effectuating the new counsel rules. The 
tentative guidelines for resolving the problems ap-
pear dependent upon the particular legal theory 
employed by each ] ustice. 
All the opinions discuss the variety of ways in 
which the legal services required by the Court's 
expansion of Gide01t can be met. ] ustice Douglas, in 
the lead opinion, suggests that legislative reform 
may meet the new demand for lawyers. His sug-
gestion is that "decriminalizing" some petty of:-
fenses would decrease the need for lawyers.33 To 
suggest that "decriminalizing" public drunkenness 
or narcotic addiction will decrease the need for 
lawyers is somewhat curious. If by decriminaliza-
tion Justice Douglas means that another form of 
state process such as an administrative agency: 
should be used, the need for lawyers has not neces-
sarily been diminished. As a matter of constitu-
tional due process principles, the "civil" processes 
of state control that involve the deprivation of 
liberty require lawyers in the adjudicative part of 
the decision-making.39 Most legislative schemes 
involving "civil" commitment already require. that 
counsel be appointed.40 It is unlikely that the Court 
will allow legislatures to take away counsel or ban 
counsel unless the principle of counsel~s necessity 
when the state deprives the individual of liberty 
is to be reexamined. Under existing constitutional 
analyses, "decriminalization" should lead to trans-
fer of perhaps non-existing lawyers from the minor 
criminal courts to the civil commitment adjudica-
tion. Perhaps Justice Douglas thinks that this civil 
adjudication will require less time than minor 
:rr 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
33 1d. at 38-39 n.9. 
39 Cf. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v. Patter-
son, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
40 See, e.g., 42 U.S. C. § 3413 (Narcotics Addict Reha-
bilitation Act); CAL. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS 
CODE § 5252.1 (West 1954) (alcoholism and mental 
illness); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.46 (mental illness) 
§§ 392.25, 392.26, 392.32 {tuberculosis), § 396.102(a) 
(alcoholism); and N.J. STAT. ANN. §30:9-12.21 (1964) 
(alcoholism). 
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criminal offenses. If so, then some more lawyers are 
available. 
Another possible legal reform of a judicial nature 
to meet the demand for lawyers is to enlarge the 
pool of available persons by modification of the 
constitutional definition of counsel. In Argersinger 
at least three Justices indicated their willingness to 
experiment with a constitutional definition of coun-
sel broader than one restricted to members of the 
organized bar.41 If law students under adequate 
faculty and professional supervision can meet the 
constitutional standard for counsel in lower courts, 
the number of "lawyers" available has been in-
creased. 
Rather than expand or experiment with various 
constitutional notions of counsel, Chief Justice 
Burger expressed faith in the ability of the tradi-
tionally organized bar to meet the needs.42 Without 
further guidance from the Court, the Chief Justice 
expressed faith that the organized bar could and 
would meet the needs generated by an evolving 
constitutional standard of counsel.43 · 
Justice Powell's approach looks directly at 
changing the Court's own constitutional analysis 
as a possible solution. He attempts to formulate a 
rule under an explicitly :flexible theory of due 
process.44 Such an analysis allows him to express 
doubts, in view of the differing ability of the states 
to furnish counsel, about the wisdom of new pro-
phylactic constitutional rules requiring counsel. 
For instance, a less rigid analysis might allow the 
requirement of counsel for the accused to depend 
upon whether the state uses counsel in the particu-
lar proceeding.45 Since the efficacy of any new 
constitutional rule in terms of maintaining the 
purpose of the principle is in doubt, Powell's analy-
sis requires the scrutinizing of each factual situa-
tion to determine if counsel's presence furthers or 
hinders the opportunity of individuals to defend 
against a deprivation of liberty.46 But since the 
41407 U.S. at 40 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by 
Stewart and Douglas, J. J.). 
42 !d. at 43-44 (Burger, C. J., concurring). 
43 !d. at 44. See also, Burger, Special Skills. 
44 I d. at 44 (Powell, J., concurring). 
45 Cj. Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a 
Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. 
REv. 1001, 1028 (1972). 
A flexible due process analysis of whether counsel is 
required in summary court martial proceedings was 
used by the Nmth Circuit recently. Daigle v. Warner 
490 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1974) See also Mills v. Municip;J 
Ct, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329 
{1973). 
46 I would adhere to the principle of due process 
that requires fundamental fairness in criminal 
state court bad tried to formulate the more rigid 
constitutional rule that counsel is required if there 
was a possibility of six months imprisonment, he 
voted to reverse and remand. 
Once it is clear that the obligation to provide 
counsel is derived from a variety of theories of due 
process, the use of different types of analysis for 
requiring or withholding counsel at certain non-
trial stages is explicable. 
The incompatible positions of some of the Jus-
tices in cases holding that counsel is required at 
"a critical stage" of the pre-trial process are ex-
amples of a conflict over what is the appropriate 
constitutional rule for counsel as opposed to the 
appropriate constitutional principle. For example, 
a recent case held that counsel was not required 
at a photo identification before trial. The major-
ity's analysis started with the assumption that 
counsel is required for the accused at certain pre-
trial stages in order to increase his opportunity to 
defend against the charge.47 The concurring and 
dissenting opinions should be read as different 
views as to whether a certain constitutional rule 
requiring counsel at a pre-trial stage is necessary 
to implement the basic principle of an opportunity 
to defend.48 Not surprisingly, a given Justice may 
find himself writing for the majority and some-
times dissenting when the Court is deciding 
whether the stage of the investigative process is 
a "critical stage" for the purposes of requiring 
counsel. A Justice may go so far as to suggest that 
his analysis of when counsel is or is not required 
keeps a semblance of principled constitutional 
adjudication.49 
A more generalized view of some of the right to 
counsel cases as constitutional rules rather than 
principles has several important consequences for 
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the 
right to counsel in petty cases whenever the as-
sistance of counsel is necessary to assure a fair 
trial. 407 u.s. 47. 
Therefore Justice Powell concludes, 
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty 
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be de-
termined by the trial courts exercising a judicial 
discretion on a case by case basis. 
If the trial court should conclude that the assist-
ance of counsel is not required in any case, it should 
state its reasons so that the issue could be pre-
served for review. ld. at 63. 
47 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). 
'
8 !d. at 321 Gustice Stewart concurring); id. at 326 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Cj. State v. Jones- La.-, 
284 So. 2d 570 (1973). 
49 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (Stewart, J., 
writing for the plurality); cj. Wellington, supra note 12. 
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criminal law decision-making. In terms of theories 
of decision-making, many of the pre-trial counsel 
"rules" are joint legislative-judicial decisions to 
control investigative agents. That is, the Court 
has explicitly recognized that some of its counsel 
rules can be "overruled" or "replaced" by legisla-
tive rules which are as fully effective as the Court's 
constitutional rules. 6° For example, if a given state 
legislature were to provide regulations and the 
resources for video tapes of line-ups, then in that 
state lineups are not necessarily "critical." 51 
Therefore, the line-up might proceed without 
counsel in that state. 
Another way of demonstrating the consequences 
of analyzing the right to counsel cases in terms of 
whether they contain principles or rules is to recon-
cile the Court's treatment of these cases under its 
constitutional retroactivity doctrine.~ The prob-
60 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
n United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967). 
BuJ see the note of Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring in 
part, dissenting in part in Wade. Id. at 262 n.*. 
62 The discussion that follows is different from Pro-
fessor Wellington's related analysis of the retroactivity 
problem of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule. 
Professor Wellington analyzes the general problem of 
retroactivity in terms of ''principles" and "policies" 
rather than in terms of principles and rules. Professor 
Wellington begins this portion of his discussion by 
stating: 
I should like to examine some of these cases, as if 
they were (to the extent that it is possible) common 
law decisions. This enables me to put asiile questions 
of federalism and habeas corpus and to test the as-
sertions of the last several pages concerning the 
legitinlacy of prospective and retroactive overrul-
ing of prior decisions and the relationship thereto 
of principles and po)icies. Id. at 258 (emphasis 
added). 
The divergence of Wellington's analysis from the one 
presented here, however, is more apparent than real. 
By his exclusion of habeas corpus and federalism, for 
purposes of analytical argument, Wellington has re-
moved that which is most crucial to the constitutional 
theory of due process proposed in this article. 
I suspect that once we feed back in the problems of 
federalism and habeas corpus, the individual Justice's 
theory of constitutional principles and rules will become 
operative as an explanation of their bel!avior on the 
retroactivity problem in the fourth amendment area. 
For instance, how an individual justice voted on the 
retroactivity of United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), may be a function of whether the Justice 
thought that Katz set forth a new principle of fourth 
amendment analysis or was merely a new rule derived 
from previously accepted principles of the constitu-
tional analysis of the fourth amendment. The accept-
ance of the principles might have to be tested on a 
Justice by Justice basis since the problem of the fourth 
amendment's exclusionary rule is a subject of the 
Justice's concept of the proper role of the Supreme Court 
in state criminal process-the problems of federalism 
and habeas corpus. I would venture that a careful 
analysis of the late Justice Harlan's approach to the 
lem for an integrated theory of the counsel cases 
is: why are some counsel cases held retroactive 
and others not under the Court's analysis? If we 
view the primary constitutional principle of the 
counsel cases to be that of the opportunity to 
defend against the deprivation of liberty, it is easy 
to see that Gideon :fits the purpose of protecting 
the integrity of the fact-finding process. 63 Similarly, 
the application of a right to counsel to juvenile 
adjudication will be viewed as "fundamental" so. 
as to require retroactive application.u However, 
the rule requiring counsel at a pre-trial line up 
or a pre-trial police interrogation is not applied 
retroactively although both rules were in further-
ance of the primary principle. 65 The explanation of 
this problem of law and time is that the constitu-
tional rules are not so fundamental that other 
decision-makers cannot change the actual effect. 
In the Court's own language, the presence of 
counsel at trial is "essential to a fair trial." 66 
As mentioned before, other decision-makers trying 
to meet the burdens of the Court's "critical stages" 
guideline might seek alternative legal remedies for 
providing counsel. 
A further refinement of this analysis is possible 
because some of the pre-trial counsel cases are 
held retroactive. 67 All of these cases are ''post-
fourth amendment over time might bare some rela~ 
tionship to his developing theory of due IJrocess. Com-
pare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) with United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 
586 Harlan, J., dissenting). Whether principles and rules 
rather than policies and principles actually explain the 
differences between the Justices in the fourth amedment 
area might be demonstrated by an analysis of the work 
of Justices Stewart and White. I will venture a hypoth-
esis that the two Justices take two different principled 
approaclles to the fourth amendment, even where they 
agree on the result. Compare Almeida-Sanchez v. United, 
States 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Stewart, J., for the major-
ity) and United States v. Edwards, _ U.S._, 42 
U.SL.W. 4463 {March 26, 1974) (White, J., for the 
Majority) witlt Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U.S. 266, 285 (White, J., dissenting) and United 
States v. Edwards,- U.S._, 42 U.SL.W. 4463, 4466 
{March 26, 1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Cj. Cupp v. 
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (Stewart, J., for the 
majority) and 412 U.S. 291, 297 {White, J., concurring). 
153 See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 
249-50 and n.14-15 (1969). 
M Cj. Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972) 
(holding In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) retro-
active). 
65 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). 
56 See note 53 supra. 
57 McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (holding 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) retro-
active); Arsenault v. Massacllusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) 
(holding White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) retro-
active). 
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indictment" as opposed to "pre-indictment." The 
explanation of this further rule of retroactivity is 
that once the indictment has come about, the 
Court thinks the principle of a fair adjudication 
must be protected. To the Court, the state process 
has shifted from investigation to adjudication. 
Thus, if one has pled guilty-the functional equiv-
alent to an adjudication at trial-without the aid 
of counsel, the Court will require retroactive 
application of the new rule.68 It is important to 
realize that the retroactivity thus turns on whether 
the post-indictment proceeding was enough like 
the actual adjudication of guilt rather than whether 
the state called the stage an "arraignment" or 
"preliminary hearing." 
Essential in this analysis is a determination. that 
the particular stage is enough like adjudication to 
be protected by those principles. The holding 
that the accused is to be offered counsel at a 
revocation hearing under a deferred sentencing 
scheme is applied, retroactively. 59 In this manner 
the Court is defining when the "criminal prosecu-
tion"-the process aimed at depriving the indi-
vidual of his liberty-has ended. 60 Thus, the Court 
is defining the end of the adjudicatozy phase of 
the criminal process rather than starting the be-
ginning of a new constitutional approach to sen-
tencing. The decision on retroactivity now has the 
significance of allowing the Court to shift its anal-
ysis of the constitutional necessity of counsel. 
Once the defendant has been adjudicated guilty 
and is under state control, the Court's analysis of 
the need for counsel shifts from the per se rules 
to an explicit case by case approach. In contrast 
to protecting the individual from a deprivation of 
liberty, the Court's most recent due process anal-
ysis of parole and probation recognizes that the 
interest to be protected is only that of "conditional 
liberty." 61 With only one dissent, the Court held 
that an individual is not per se entitled to counsel 
at a probation or parole revocation hearing. 62 
Under such an analysis, the decision to have coun-
sel at a parole or probation revocation hearing is 
to be decided on a case by case basis. A due process 
analysis is required because from the perspective 
of a person on parole or probation-at conditional 
liberty-some form of official decision-making 
68 ld. But see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
69 McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (holding 
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) retroactive). 
60 Cj. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
61 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, (1973). Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) 
62 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US. 778 (1973). 
takes place when parole or probation is revoked. 
Thus, the Court sees that counsel may sometimes 
be required to insure the integrity of that legal 
decision. 63 The Court explicitly did not consider 
the situation where an individual, claiming a lack 
of funds, was denied counsel when the state allowed 
everyone else with the available resources to have 
counsel. M The significance of this type of analysis 
is that the states actually have more latitude in 
structuring sentencing or dispositional decision-
making processes than trial processes. It may be, 
for instance, constitutional to deny everyone, 
"rich" and "poor," counsel before, the parole 
board when it revokes parole if the other resources 
of decision-making are deemed adequate. These 
other resources are essentially a parole board with 
an adequate number of members, an investigative 
staff, and a mechanism of reviewing the board's 
decisions. 65 It is also possible to conceive of a sys-
tem of sentencing done by a panel of experts 
without laWYers as an initial matter, if a legisla-
ture thought it appropriate and devoted adequate 
resources to make the system reasonably func-
tional to its purposes. 
But from the Supreme Court's institutional posi-
tion of protecting the essentials of the fair trial or 
fair adjudication, the presence or absence of a 
laWYer is not the definitive label in constitutional 
analysis. Having developed over the years an 
analysis using counsel as an operative principle, 
an integrated theory of due process allows the 
Court to see the limits of its own principles. A 
rule of evidence66 or a rule on the order of present-
ing witnesses67 may violate the policies of fair 
trial because the Court sees the particular state 
rules as interferring with the laWYer's ability to 
defend the accused. It is also possible that the 
Court's notions of fairness in terms of the adversary 
system's method of trial adjudication will lead to 
the result that a state's requirement that the 
63Jd. 
64 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 783 n.6. 
Such a separation of the two issues of due process and 
equal protection e;-.-plains, for instance, Justice Bren-
nan's concurrence in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, and 
his joining of the majority in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra. 
In Morrissey he states the issue remains open as to 
whether counsel must be furnished to the indigent pa-
rolee if the non indigent parolee is allowed counsel. 408 
U.S. at 491. See Dobbs v. Wallace, 201 S.E.2d 914 
(W. Va. 1974) (failure to appoint counsel to represent 
indigent parolees held denial of equal protection where 
the state permits parolees to be represented by retained 
counsel). 
66 408 U.S. at 484-90. 
66 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
67 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972). 
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defendant give notice of alibi68 will not violate due 
process unless the defendant's lawyer is precluded 
from a reciprocal right to discover prosecution 
evidence in order to defend. 69 
Viewing the Court's right to counsel cases pri-
marily in terms of principles and rules that are 
related to other policies of fair adjudication may 
help to explain why more definitive statements on 
what is effective assistance of counsel have not 
developed. First, the Court appears committed to 
counsel as essential to the opportunity to defend.7o 
Second, without a functional definition of counsel, 
there can be few, if any constitutional rules as to 
when counsel has failed to defend adequately.n 
The reason that ingenious counsel or sympathetic 
courts have been unable to develop the constitu-
tional principles or rules of ineffective counsel may 
be because there is really little agreement as to 
how the constitutional function of counsel is to 
be defined. Or put in terms of decision-making, 
it is not clear what is the appropriate forum to 
even raise the issue72 of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, not to mention develop the necessary con-
stitutional doctrines. But more important is that 
the other constitutional doctrines developed to 
protect the notions of criminal law decision-making 
may achieve the same functional results as any 
proposed ineffective assistance of counsel doc-
trines. Yet in other decisions dealing with access 
to review of a conviction, there has been continu-
ous disagreement of the doctrinal origins of the 
principles and rules of access of review of a criminal 
conviction. But once these cases are analyzed in 
terms of the function of review, the conflict can 
be resolved consistent with the theory of decision-
making proposed.7a 
£a Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
t 9 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
7° That is, the Court is unwilling to consider Pro-
fessor Hazard's suggestion of making the process fair by 
eliminating lawyers for the state. Hazard, Rationing 
Justice1 8 J. LAW AND EcoNOMICS 1, 8 (1965) [herein-
after crted as Hazard, Rationing Justice]. 
71 See, e.g., United States v. De Coster, 487 F.2d 
1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Beusley v. United States, 14 
CRill. L. REP. 2427 {6th Cir. January 21, 1974); Coles v. 
Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
849 (1968); United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 
F.2d 976, 98~1 (7th Cir. 1948); Diggs v. Welsh, 148 
F.2d Q67 (1945); People v. Washington, 41 ill. 2d 16, 
241 N.E. 425 (1968). See also Johnson v. Vincent, 14 
CRill. L. REP. 2425 (S.D.N.Y. January 30, 1974) 
(ineffective assistance of appellate counsel). 72 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 55 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 73 A liberty due process analysis of Gideon's sixth and 
fourteenth amendment requirements is essential to the 
resolution of the emerging issue of the right to proceed 
without counsel. Compare People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 
B. Access to Review of a Conviction-Litigati1:g 
the Legitimacy of State Control 
The Court's own opinions dealing with criminal 
appeals suggest that at least one criminal appeal 
is constitutionally required. Griffin v. Illinois,u the 
origin of the modem theory of access to review, 
contains the analytical conflict that has prevented 
a clear recognition of the principle of an oppor-
tunity to litigate the legitimacy of state control. 
Justice Black's opinion insists upon equal access 
on the part of indigents to review of their convic-
tions.75 Subsequent cases involving the waiver of 
filing fees,76 the screening of appeals,77 and the 
appointment of appellate counsel78 were also de-
cided on the basis of equalizing the plight of the 
"rich" and the ''poor" in the criminal process. 
All of these cases restate Justice Black's proposi-
tion that the states are not constitutionally re-
quired to provide appellate review of criminal 
convictions for anyone, rich or poor.79 It does 
appear illogical to insist upon constitutional access 
for indigents to something-review of a convic-
tion-that is not constitutionally required for the 
rich and the poor alike. 
The manner in which the apparent inconsistency 
can be resolved is to recognize that there is a con-
stitutional principle that requires that a convicted 
individual must have an opportunity to litigate 
the legitimacy of state control. The Court's failure 
to articulate this principle in the cases dealing with 
access may be due to the fact that the Justices have 
been unable, even recently, to agree on a doctrinal 
448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, (1972) (holding 
that there is no constitutional right to defend pro se) 
with United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1138 
(1972) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring) (holding there 
is). See also Faretta v. California, _U.S.__, 94 S. Ct. 
1559 (1974) (cert. granted). 
74351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
76 351 U.S. at 16-20. 76 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). 77 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). 78 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 79 Griffin v. illinois, 351 U.S. at 18; Draper v. Wash-
ington, 372 U.S. at 456-500; Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. at 355-58; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. at 257-58. The 
approach is criticized by Justice Harlan who dissents in 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 29 and Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. at 360. The proposition that there is no 
constitutional right of appeal is also recited in Lindsey 
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972); Monger v. Florida, 
405 U.S. 958 (1972) cert. denied, (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 
(1969). 
An opportunity to re-examine the issue of a right of 
appeal may be forthcoming. See Ross v. Moffitt, 483 
F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 415 U.S. 909 
(1974). 
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basis for deciding any given access case.80 A variety 
of due process and equal protection arguments 
have been advanced to explain the result of any 
given case.81 The failure to clearly establish the 
principle on some fourteenth amendment ground 
has been of no practical importance to the Court. 
But the failure to make the analytical distinctions 
requited by a recognition of the principle could 
have important practical consequences to others 
trying to meet the Court's many constitutional 
requirements. By analogy, the failure to start with 
the principle that every convicted individual is 
entitled to review is like confusing the question of 
whether everyone is entitled to a lawyer with the 
issue of whether the state must provide lawyers 
for those without resourc~ to pay for a laywer 
within the criminal process.82 Analyzed in terms of 
principles, implicit in the access cases is the rule 
that a state prosecution must include at least one 
opportunity for review of the conviction. 
An integral and explicit part of the principle of 
litigating the legitimacy of state control is the 
requirement of a lawyer's assistance in a criminal 
appeal. In Douglas v. Calijornia,83 decided the same 
day as Gideon, the Court required the states to 
provide the convicted person with a lawyer on his 
first appeal-as-of-right. Justice Douglas, for the 
majority, reasoned that the "poor" convicted per-
son must have as "meaningful" an appeal as the 
rich convicted person who could afford and utilize 
the services of a lawyer. He reached the result 
without any specification as to whether notions of 
due process, equal protection, or some combination 
of the two required the result.M Once again, it 
should be apparent that the poor must be placed 
on an equal footing to those with more resources 
only because the rich have something that is funda-
mental-review with the assistance of a lawyer. 
Making Douglas consistent with Griffin v.lllinois,85 
the ''leading case," under the integrated analysis 
requires only a traditional type of reconciliation 
of the two cases. In Griffin, Justice Black suggested 
8° See, e.g., Grifli.n v. lllinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 12 (Black, J., 
writing for the plurality). 
81 Kamisar and Choper, The Right to Counsel in 
Minnesota: Some Field Findings and Legal-Poluy Ob-
seroations, 48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 7-14 (1963). 
See Mitchell v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 349 {6th Cir. 
·1973); Ross v. Moffitt, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), 
cert. granted., 415 U.S. 909 (1974). 
82 See text supra at 269. 
83372 u.s. 353 {1963). 
Mid. 
85 351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
that the equalizing notion means the state courts 
have to furnish a transcript unless "other means of 
affording adequate appellate review to indigents" 
are found.86 After Douglas, it is apparent that those 
alternative means do not mean review absent the 
participation of a lawyer in the appellate process. 
Without reading Griffin and Douglas together to 
delineate the underlying principle, the Court's 
analysis would appear to allow the states the 
option of eliminating lawyers in criminal appeals 
for everyone.87 Under the integrated analysis, the 
option does not exist. Rather the integrated anal-
ysis' explicit articulation of the principle makes it 
easier to distinguish the problems of access in 
criminal law from the problems of access in other 
types of legal processes.88 
More recent attempts to apply the Griffin ra-
tionale are not inconsistent with the above argu-
ment that a criminal prosecution requires some 
minimal means of review. In Mayer v. Clzicago89 
the unanimous Court held that an individual con-
victed and fined under a city ordinance was en-
titled to a record sufficient for access to review.90 
ss 351 U.S. at 20. 
87 H the issue were ever raised, review of a criminal 
conviction would be held to be a "fundamental" aspect 
of the criminal process. Note, Tlze Supreme Court, 1962 
Term, 77 HAR.v. L. REv. 62, 108 (1963). Cf. Texas v. 
Pruett, 470 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1972), ajf'd, 414, U.S. 
802 (1973). To arrive at such a result, the Court would 
need two related theories. One important theoretical 
consideration would be the functions appellate courts 
should perform in the criminal process. Cf. L. ORPmLD, 
CRIMINAL APPROACH (1939). The other consideration 
woUld be a legal theory of access to review of a criminal 
conviction. Either something like the Brennan or Har-
lan rationale could be used as a starting point for such 
a theory. The Harlan rationale, however, should be pre-
ferred because his theory of due process takes account 
of the allocation of judicial and other resources. Fur-
thermore, when faced with the question of whether due 
process requires some system of review, Harlan was the 
only Justice to articulate a connection between requir-
ing counsel and review of the initial determination. In 
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 72 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
See also Saltzburg, Tlze Harm of Harmless Error, 59 
VA. L. REv. 988, 1028-29, 1028 n.148 (1973). 
88 Counsel for the petitioners in Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), were surprised that the Court 
decided in their favor on an explicit due process ground. 
LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: 
Boddie v. Connectuut, 1971 DUKE L. J 487. See also id. 
at 52Q-21 n.153. See note 80 infra. 
sg 404 U.S. 189 (1971). 
oo A leading co=entator has suggested that the 
more recent Argersinger incarceration-in-fact rule 
means the Court might now view Mayer differently. L. 
HALL, Y. KAM!sAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. IsRAEL, MoDERN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 27 {Supp.Jan.1973).ButsuCh 
al).alysis. fails to distinguish the issues of an opportunity 
to defend from access to review. 
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However, in Britt v. North Carolina,91 which did 
not involve access to review of a criminal convic-
tion, the Court held that the denial of a transcript 
of the defendant's first trial that ended in a mis-
trial was justified under the "narrow circum-
stances." While those circumstances were not 
sufficiently different from cases where the Court 
had required a transcript of a preliminary hearing, 92 
for the two dissenters, Britt demonstrates the in-
herent difficulties of applying Griffin without a 
clear articulation of its basic principles.93 
Facing the issue in terms of access to review of 
criminal convictions allows for a discussion of this 
issue in terms of its limits-the problem of finality 
of criminal convictions. Given a process that re-
quires lawyers in the trial and appellate process, 
the notion of "challenge" and litigation pervades 
the system.94 Yet every legal process must deter-
mine when the litigation has ended. For instance, 
deciding when federal habeas corpus relief is avail-
able can be seen in terms of allocating the time of 
counsel, the opportunity to defend, and the oppor-
tunity to review the guilt determination in the 
state proceedings.95 Despite the uncomfortable-
ness of the suggestion, we must now recognize 
Professor Hazard's suggestion that courts, legisla-
tures, and now court administrators, are "ration-
91404 u.s. 226 (1972). 
g2 Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967). 
ga As the equality notion of Griffin is expanded from 
review stages, broadly defined, the equal protection-
due process dichotomy reappears. When the issue is 
whether "indigents" can be jailed for failure to pay fines, 
a unanimous court cannot agree on a. rationale. Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Dlinois, 399 
U.S. 40 (1970). The confiict is even more dramatic when 
the issue is the applicability or inapplicability of Griffit~ 
to the issue of filing fees to divorce cases. Justice Harlan, 
for the majority, in Boddietv. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 
(1971), cites and uses Griffin as a case dealing solely 
with access to courts and the allocation of judicial re-
sources. Id. at 382. Justice Black, the sole dissenter and 
author of Griffin, thought its rationale wholly inappli-
cable to "civil" cases. Id. at 385-86. Concurring, 
Justice Douglas reads Griffin as an equal protection 
case dealing with a principle of invidious discrimination 
based on poverty. Id. at 388. The other concurring 
justice, Brennan, prefers a joint due process and equal 
protection rationale of Griffin. He holds that a fee re-
quirement for the indigent in a divorce case is a denial 
of equal access to the courts. Id. at 390. Cf. Brickman, 
Of Arterial Passageways through tlze Legal Process: Tire 
Riglzt of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Ser-
vices, 48 N.Y.UL. REv. 595 (1973); Michelman, Tlze 
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Riglzt to 
Protect One's Riglrt's-Part I, 1973 DUKE L. J. 1153 
(1973). 
Pi pACKER, LIMITS at 204.-38. 
P5 Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 250, 
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring); cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 
411 u.s. 475 (1973). 
ing justice" 96 in terms of particular views of the 
competence of counsel at trial or pre-trial stages, 
and the ability of an appellate court to review 
guilt determination with or without counsel's 
active participation.97 
C. The Principle of Advocacy in Review 
of Criminal Convictions 
Until Anders v. Calijomia98 the Court had man-
aged to avoid explicit discussion of the principle 
originating in Gideon in a case purporting to deal 
solely with the Griffin lines of cases. As noted 
previously, the rule requiring appointed counsel 
on appeals, although decided on the same day as 
Gideon, relied solely upon Griffin. 99 Justice Clark 
combined the two lines of cases in Amlers in de-
ciding that appointed appellate counsel could not 
file a "no merit" letter rather than a brief on the 
merits without explicit exposition.100 Acting on the 
assumption that the convicted person had a law-
yer to defend him because of theprincipleof Gideon, 
the Court had implicitly assumed that there might 
be an argnable issue for appellate review. This 
assumption is reinforced by the Court's require-
ment of appointment of appellate counsel under 
the principle of Griffin. But to put these implicit 
assumptions into an integrated theory, Anders 
should be recognized as establishing a third prin-
ciple of criminal law decision-making. That prin-
ciple is that counsel in a criminal appeal has the 
obligation of advocacy. As a new principle, Anders 
is the starting point for integrating the functions 
of appellate courts and counsel in criminal law. 
While the opinion in Anders is replete with refer-
Ps Hazard, Rationing Justice, supra note 70. 
rn Limiting access to federal review of the volun-
tariness of guilty pleas is apparently dependent on the 
assumption that counsel performs his obligation to 
defend. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 
(1970). The obligation to defend includes, in at least 
Justice White's view, the obligation to litigate the vol-
untariness of a confession along the available avenues. 
At the time of the plea in question, Jackson v. Denno, 
378 U.S. 368 {1964), was not the law. Underlying Justice 
White's analysis is a further assumption that defense 
lawyers will not allow individuals with conceivable legal 
defenses (i.e. suppression of a confession that leads to 
lack of evidence for the jury to convict) to plead guilty. 
If subsequent analysis or research proves White's as-
sumptions erroneous, the present acceptance of guilty 
pleas and the bargain model of criminal law. See, e.g., 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 495 (1971), will be 
brought into question. See also discussion in text infra 
p. 281. 
98 386 u.s. 738 {1967). 
99 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
lOD 386 U.S. at 742-45. 
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ences to notions of advocacy for the indigent/01 
neither the opinion nor subsequent discussions 
clearly articulate that the Court has established a 
new principle. 
Most discussions of Anders have improperly 
assumed that the major issue left open for resolu-
tion after Anders is the definition of a "frivolous 
appeal." 102 Such discussions are misguided since 
the Court's statement that counsel can request 
withdrawal if the claim is "wholly frivolous," 1oa 
is only one rule to implement the more general 
principle of advocacy.l04 
A critical examination of Anders' companion 
case, Entsmi1tger v. Iowa,I05 will demonstrate that 
establishing the principle of advocacy is Anders' 
major innovation. Despite a court order to :file a 
full record, briefs, and be prepared for oral argu-
ment, counsel simply :filed a "clerk's transcript." 1os 
The state court's short per curiam affirmance of 
the conviction was inadequate primarily because 
appellate counsel failed to take advantage of the 
appellate procedures available.107 Mter Entsminger 
there is no rule that says "clerk's transcript" or 
that "no merit letters" are per se unconstitutional. 
Rather the constitution prohibits the use of either 
procedure in such a way as to inhibit or encourage 
appellate counsel to abandon his obligation of 
advocacy.108 
Clarifying the underlying principle of Anders is 
only the beginning of the appellate courts' job. 
But given such clarification, courts should be aware 
101 386 U.S. at 741-42. 
102Hermann, Frivolous Criminal Appeals, 47 N.Y. 
U.L. REv. 701 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hermann, 
Frivolous Appeals]; Note, Screening of Criminal Cases in 
tlze Federal Courts of Appeal: Practice and Proposals, 73 
COLUM. L. REV. 77 (1973). 
103 386 U.S. at 744. 
104 I d. 
105 386 u.s. 748 (1967). 
106386 U.S. at 750. 
101386 U.S. at 752. 
1oa See, e.g., MISSOURI STAT. ANN., Rules of Criminal 
Procedure § 29.01(c) (1969). After Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) was decided, the Missouri 
supreme court amended its rules to require appoint-
ment of counsel for indigents who wish to appeal. 
Gerard, Tlze Right to Counsel in Missouri: A Limited 
Inquiry, into the Factual and Theoretical Underpinnings 
of Douglas v. California, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 463, 464 
and n.4 {1965). Under the present rules appointed 
appellate counsel is required to submit a brief which 
modifies one appellate route available in Missouri be-
fore Douglas and Anders, that of appeal by means of a 
motion for a new trial for which no brief is required. 
ld. at 465. It is Gerard's thesis generally that the 
motion for a new trial procedure did not adequately 
provide the indigent appellant with the resources of 
counsel. 
of the wide range of combinations of rules that 
might effectuate the principle. Careful examina-
tion of any proposed rule will reveal wide ramifica-
tions for the appellate courts' relationship to other 
institutions. For instance, in formulating a rule to 
implement Anders, a court must make judgments 
about the general quality of counsel in its jurisdic-
tion. In some specific situations courts might 
need to consider in addition the effect of a state-
wide system as compared with other arrangements 
for providing legal services to the indigent.l09 
Overall, however, the failure of most courts to 
see and address issues like those outlined above 
has led to some misuses of the Anders principle. 
Without critical examination of the appellate 
courts, counsel, and the rules of appellate proce-
dure in a given jurisdiction, there may be a tend-
ency of courts and commentators to see contradic-
tions in the law where in fact none exists. Also, a 
court may improperly assume that the major issue 
left open for resolution after Anders is under what 
circumstances can appellate counsel withdraw.l1° 
Armed with an inadequate analysis of Anders, 
courts may go beyond constitutional principles in 
attempts to deal with the problems of advocacy.111 
For example, the California courts at one time 
went beyond the requirements of advocacy. In In 
re KetclzelJ12 the court required that the defendant 
receive a psychiatric examination on the theory 
that appellate counsel might use the expert in-
formation to develop a theory of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel at trial.113 While the court thought 
the spirit of Anders required such a result,114 it 
failed to consider whether its notion of the obliga-
tion of advocacy went beyond any theory of de-
fense offered at trial.115 Anders requires that ap-
pellate counsel, as an advocate, argue every issue 
that might be in the record. But the court is in-
correct in assuming that Anders provides guidance 
for what are the proper rules of appellate proce-
dure. Given the operation of the California appel-
to9 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A (1971); 
Trebach, A Modern Defender System for New Jersey, 12 
RuTGERS L. REv. 289 (1957). 
11o See, e.g., Barber v. State, 471 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1971). 
w Throughout all of these proposed solutions is the 
uneasy feeling that appellate counsel cannot withdraw. 
Cf. Doherty, Wolf! Wolj!-Tlze Ramifications of Frivo-
lous Appeals, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1968). 
112 68 Cal. 2d 397, 438 P.2d 625, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881 
(1968). 
113 I d. at 401, 438 P.2d at 628, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 884. 
114 I d. at 402, 438 P.2d at 629, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 885. 
mId. at 403-06, 438 P.2d 629-31, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 
885-87, (dissenting opinion). 
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late courts, the court might legitimately want to 
have higher standards than Anders, but those 
standards should be stated as such.116 
More recent discussions interpreting Anders in 
California have focused on the issue of protecting 
effective appeal. In In Re Banks,111 a state habeas 
corpus proceeding, the appellate court held that 
the petitioner had been denied his right of "effec-
tive advocacy by appellate counsel." 118 The case 
is a curious one since the petitioner's involvement 
in the various state and federal review mechanisms 
spanned nearly a ten year period.119 The attempt 
to obtain the effective advocacy eventually re-
quired by the court involved three trips to the 
United States Supreme Court and numerous re-
quests for appointment of different appellate 
counsel.l2° The Court went on to hold that the 
petitioner's constitutional rights had been violated 
in his 1962 trial by the prosecution's comments 
upon his refusal to take the stand. In deciding to 
115 See, e.g., In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 
90 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (the kind of arguments an active 
appellate advocate could and should make are outlined 
in the opinion). 
117 4 Cal. 3d 337, 482 P.2d 215, 93 Cal. Rptr. 591 
(1971). 
118 Id. at 340, 482 P.2d at 217, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 593. 
nv mstory of the appeals of In re Banks: 1. August 
9, 1962 judgment was entered on two counts of robbery 
and one count of attempted robbery. Petitioner had 
conducted his own defense. 2. Petitioner filed a timely 
appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Court-appointed 
appellate counsel received several continuances and two 
requests from the clerk of the court to file a brief. Fi-
nally, over a year later, a twenty three page brief was 
:filed. The brief cited only two cases. In 1964 the strong-
est appellate argument was denial of counsel at trial, 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and yet 
the case was not cited. Counsel then dropped the case 
and wrote to petitioner, but did not send the court a 
no-merit letter as required. See In re Nash, 61 Cal. 
2d 491, 393 P.2d 405, 39 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1964). 3. Peti-
tioner sought relief in propria persona. The United 
States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for con-
sideration in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 
(1965). Banks v. California, 382 U.S. 420 (1966). 4. 
Petitioner requested appointment of different counsel, 
but the court of appeals denied his request. It informed 
counsel he might brief and present oral argument. 
However, Counsel did not submit a brief, or motion, 
and did not appear to argue the case. Court of appeals 
affirmed. 5. Petitioner sought relief again in propria 
persona. The United States Supreme Court vacated 
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Banks v. Cali-
fornia, 387 U.S. 92 {1967). 6. Court of Appeals again 
affirmed. 7. Banks petitioned the United States Su-
preme Court a third time. Certiorari was dismissed for 
petitioner's failure to petition the California supreme 
court for a hearing. Banks v. California, 395 U.S. 708 
(1969). 4 Cal. 3d at 340-42, 341 n.1, 593 n.1, 482 P.2d 
at 217-18, 217 n.1, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94. 
:120 Id. 
consider the merits in this collateral proceeding, 
the court had to decide why its usual remedy of 
reinstating the appeal did not apply to the case. 
Two factors moved the court to decide the case 
on the merits. One factor was "conservation of 
scarce judicial resources." The other was the able 
advocacy of the newly appointed counsel.121 The 
court failed, however, to discuss whether its dis-
position of the case would have prevented the 
numerous appeals cases at hand or in future cases. 
The long range resolutions of the problem of 
numerous appeals lies in the California courts' 
effective use of the "Anders Brief." It is a brief 
required by the Court in Anders, consisting of any 
arguable points with citations to the record and 
relevant cases that must be filed before counsel 
can withdraw.122 The California rule of allowing 
withdrawal of counsel after a full discussion of all 
the issues in the record and deciding to dismiss an 
appeal as "frivolous" is the rule used by most 
states. 
Another solution to numerous appeals is to use 
the apparently contradictory rule of not allowing 
appointed counsel to withdraw.123 Those states 
forcing counsel to file appellate briefs rather than 
"Anders Briefs" may have different views as to 
the best allocation of the resources of counsel, 
time spent on direct appeal review, and time spent 
on collateral review of conviction. Both rules per-
mit appellate courts to perform their function of 
reviewing a conviction with the aid of counsel.m 
What then appears to be a conflict between 
courts allowing the Anders briefs and those requir-
ing appellate briefs is only two different rules to 
enforce the obligation of advocacy. The real' con-
flict in the case law has developed as a result of 
the failure of some courts to see that the appellate 
courts, rather than lawyers, must administer any 
rules. In an attempt to prevent the ''Brief Against 
the Client," 125 one court has tried to admonish 
appointed counsel to imagine that he were being 
paid in deciding whether to withdraw.126 However, 
W.Id. at 343, 482 P.2d at 219-20, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 
595-96. 
122 See, e.g., People v. Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d 444, 432 
P.2d 21, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967). 
m Dixon v. State, 284 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1972); McClendon v. People, 481 P.2d 715 (Colo. 
1971); State v. Gates, 466 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 1971); 
State v. Cheelester, 26 Utall 2d 300, 488 P.2d 1045 {1971). 
124 See notes 108, 109 and 117 sttjJra. 
125 Suggs v. United States, 391 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). 
126 I d. at 977-78 {appendix). 
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such a rule encourages counsel to consider for 
himself if the appeal is likely to succeed. Further-
more, the standard ignores the possibility that at 
a certain point of lack of probability of success, a 
paying client will decline to pursue an appeal. 
Even prior to Anders the federal statutory scheme 
for indigent appeals had been interpreted as pre-
venting lawyers from deciding who gains access to 
review.127 Once a judicial officer has issued a cer-
tificate of probable cause, 128 the question of whether 
to pursue the appeal has ended. The case ought to 
be argued in the appellate court on the basis of 
any conceivable point in the record. 
Lawyers seem peculiarly aware of the fact that 
appeals to the indigent are costless and thus from 
the indigent's point of view every appeal ought to 
be pursued.129 Yet, lawyers like to "win" appeals 
and may "resent" the suggestion that they are 
bound only to make the appellate arguments that 
support the defense presented below. Such a re-
quirement on appellate counsel puts in proper 
perspective two problems generated by Anders. 
The first of these problems is appellate counsel's 
obligation when the client pled guilty but has 
appealed. Under the proposed analysis, the answer 
is a choice between two options dependent upon 
the goals of the particular appellate courts. Either 
the plea was involuntary in the sense that present 
constitutional standards or the state's own stand-
ards were no-t observed in receiving the plea;130 or 
counsel can simply inform the court that there is 
no appellate argument to be made because there 
was no defense made out below.131 The appellate 
court must determine which option it prefers. The 
first option would be important to an appellate 
court seriously interested in scrutinizing plea bar-
gaining with an eye towards some reform.132 The 
127 Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958). 
128 28 U.S.C.A. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
R.24; Third Cir. R.7B. 
129 Hermann, Frivolous Appeals, at 701; A.B.A. PROJ-
ECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE 
STANDARDS RELATED TO CRIMINAL APPEALS 63-64 
(Approved Draft 1970). 
1ao See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); cf. 
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 434 Pa. 423, 253 A.2d 258 
(1969) (holding that a psychiatric examination is not 
required before plea of guilty is accepted). 
131 See, e.g., People v. Barrios, 1 Til. App. 3d 1029, 
274 N.E.2d 662 (1971); People v. Grant, 1 Til. App. 3d 
658, 274 N.E.2d 603 (1971); People v. Bell, 130 Til. 
App. 2d 791, 267 N.E.2d 367 (1971); People v. Carter, 
92 Til. App. 2d 120, 235 N.E.2d 382 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Sparks, 438 Pa. 77, 263 A.2d 414 (1970). 
132 National Commission on Goals & Policies of 
Criminal Law chaired by Gov. Peterson recommended 
second option may be adopted by a court willing 
to await federal constitutional developments by, 
in effect, forcing the defendant to pursue collateral 
attack in both state and federal courts.133 
The other major problem to be noted, especially 
in those jurisidictions that disallow the "Anders 
Brief," is what appellate counsel should do with 
the trial record without any "good" arguments.134 
The manner in which appellate courts should 
construe this issue is whether counsel below made 
out a defense at all. Courts should distinguish two 
kinds of cases. One is where appellate counsel 
dislikes the arguments or defense strategy pre-
sented at trial or considers them lacking in merit. 
The others are situations where apparently no 
defense was presented.135 In the first kinds of cases 
appellate courts should force appellate counsel to 
be advocates. In the latter cases, appellate counsel 
should present a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel. 
Such a claim by appellate counsel should not be 
viewed as an occasion for disciplinary action 
against trial counsel.136 Rather, raising the issue 
gives the appellate court an opportunity to scru-
tinize the actual quality of trial counsel. Such 
scrutiny by appellate courts is the starting point 
of the development of a doctrine of effective assist-
ance of trial counsel based on the obligation to 
defend. Until an appellate court has started to 
assess the quality of counsel in criminal cases 
generally, however, there should be no haste to 
develop a new ill-defined constitutional doctrine 
of effective assistance.137 Also an appellate court 
may be achieving functionally what is meant by 
"effective assistance" of counsel by enforcing both 
eliminating plea bargaining in the next 10 years. The 
California supreme court may be indicating a willing-
ness to scrutinize the plea bargaining process. People v. 
Martin, 9 Cal. 3d. 687, 511 P.2d 1161, 108 Cal. Rptr. 
809 (1973). 
133 State v. Borough, 279 Minn. 199 n.2, 156 N.W. 
2d 757, 759 n.2 (1968). 
134Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 703. 
135 United States v. Camodeo, 367 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 
1966), vacated and remanded, 387 U.S. 575, aff'd, 383 
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1967) (although arguably the govern-
ment's failure to produce a witness was an error but the 
error was not preserved by defense counsel). 
136 Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Ejficiet1t" Courts in a 
Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 653, 671 (1971) 
[hereinafter cited as Bazelon, Efficient Courts]. 
137 Bazelon, Tire Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 
U. Crn. L. REv. 1 (1973); Bines, Remedying Ineffective 
Representation in Crimi11al Cases: Departure from 
Habeas Corptts, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973) [hereinafter 
cited as Bines,· Ineffective Representation]. 
See also United States v. De Costa, 487 F.2d 1197 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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an obligation to defend at trial and an obligation 
of advocacy on appeal. 
Some of the recommendations of the organized 
bar are really contrary to the underlying principles 
of Anders. The suggestion that counsel can waive 
oral argument if the appeal is not meritorious133 
will encourage lawyers to effectuate that which a 
unanimous court condemned in Entsminger--an 
inadequate appeal. If oral argument is not neces-
sary, court rules can accommodate this problem 
by placing the case on a summary calendar.139 In 
this manner the court makes the basic decision of 
access to appellate review and the quality of that 
review. 
II. TERMINATING REVIEW AND "SPEEDY 
DISPOSITIONS" OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 
While the principle of advocacy applies equally 
to federal and state cases, its application in federal 
cases raises three significant issues not clearly dis-
cernible in an examination of state court response 
to Anders. The review function of federal courts 
in crintinallaw differs significantly from that func-
tion in state courts. When the federal court, as a 
habeas corpus court, reviews a state conviction, 
the court may need to consider the previous oppor-
tunities for review.140 Second, since the origins of 
m Waiver of oral argument and submission of a 
brief was proposed by the ABA Advisory Co=ittee on 
Sentencing and Review. The Full House of Delegates 
rejected the Advisory Committee's draft on this point. 
Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 703 n.12. However, such 
a route is suggested for appeals without issues of sub-
stance as distinguished from frivolous appeals. ABA 
PROJECT ON M1Nn.rtm STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JusTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS 
5 (Approved draft 1970) § 3.2 b(ii) provides: 
If the client wishes to proceed it is better£ or counsel 
to present the case, so long as his advocacy does 
not involve deception or misleading the court. 
After preparing and filing a brief on behalf of the 
client, counsel may appropriately suggest that the 
case be submitted on briefs or request permission 
to witlzdraw, (underlining added to tentative draft}. 
See also co=entary, I d. at 6. 
139 Fifth Cir. Rule 18; Third Cir. Rule 12(e). See also 
NLRB v. Local No. 42, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost In-
sulators & Asbestos \Vkrs., 476 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 
1973); Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. of 
N.Y., 431 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1970); Murphy v. Houma 
Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1969}; Huth v. S. 
Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969} (summary dis-
position without oral argument). The Supreme Court 
has denied certiorari to review the fifth and fourth 
circuit screening procedures. United States v. Ambers, 
416 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1969}, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1039 
(1970); In re Louisiana Loan & Thrift Corp., 416 F.2d 
898 {5th Cir. 1969}, cert. denied sub 1Jom. Holohan v. 
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); Pluchino v. United 
States, 410 U.S. 958 (1973) (cert. denied). 
uo Friendly, Is bmoce11ce Iffelevantf Collateral Attack 
the doctrines of right to counsel and access to re-
view are in the federal constitution, innovations in 
the area are likely to be matters of federal law. A 
disastrous effect of the failure to analyze Anaers 
for federal courts may be an attempt to debate and 
decide issues which will prove non-productive. 
Third, federal courts are already equipped with 
the resources, in terms of personnel and functional 
definitions, that make them particularly appropri-
ate for a study of the functions of appellate courts. 
Because of recent legislation authorizing a research 
function as part of the federal appellate courts,141 
these courts are uniquely situated to ask and 
answer questions about the relationship of counsel 
and the review function in crintinal law. 
A. Advocacy in Federal Courts 
The difference in review function of federal and 
state courts in criminal law cannot be described 
merely in terms of relative breadth. Federal courts 
review not only federal criminal convictions but 
also state criminal convictions after state appel-
late review has determined that conviction and 
confinement of the individual is prima facie legiti-
mate. As to the latter function of reviewing state 
convictions, the convicted individual can invoke 
federal judicial process of review \vithout a law-
yer.142 Also, federal courts have increased access 
to review through liberalized pleading for state 
prisoners143 and liberal construction of the federal 
habeus corpus statute.144 At the same time the 
courts have developed "screening devices" to limit 
access to review.145 An often suggested solution to 
unlimited access is to appoint a lawyer for the pro 
se litigant in federal court.146 However well-mean-
ing the suggestion, if adopted, lawyers will become 
the screeners or the deniers of access to review. 
on Crimina! J1ldgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970). 
[hereinafter cited as Friendly I. Collateral Attack]. 
m 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-29 (19t0} (Federal Judicial Cen-
ter). 
xusee, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 
143 Cj. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). 
144 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Fay v. 
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 {1963). 
146 Note, Screening of Criminal Cases i1: t/ze Federal 
Courts of Appeals: Practice and Proposals, 73 Couru. 
L. REv. 77 (1973). See also 28 U.S. C. § 636(b) (3) {1970) 
which authorized district courts to use United States 
magistrates to screen post-conviction applications. 
"The additional duties authorized by rule may include, 
but are not restricted to ... (3) preliminary review of 
applications for post trial relief made by individuals 
convicted of crinlinal offenses .... " 
146 But see Zeigler & Hermann, T!te ImJisible Litigant: 
An Inside View of ProSe Litigation in t!te Federal Courts, 
47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 157, 250 (1972). 
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The federal courts must recognize that it is 
better for state prisoners to have access to federal 
review of a conviction without lawyers. In the 
first place if the convicted person bas proceeded 
at trial and at least one appeal with a lawyer, be 
is hoping to obtain relief where the combined 
efforts of two lawyers have failed.147 Second, if 
the petition lacks merit, it is the federal court's 
responsibility to say so and make the difficult 
determination of when a given piece of criminal 
litigation is final. The federal courts must develop 
legal doctrines that limit access in order to prevent 
lawyers from making the determination of when 
criminal litigation is final.I48 Finally, the federal 
court's ability to make the determination of final-
ity will be a function of its ability to enforce the 
obligation of advocacy in the state courts.149 
In one sense the federal courts, in their review 
of criminal convictions, have created the "law 
explosion" or the emphasis on "legality" 150 in 
criminal law. And as the source of any further 
doctrinal developments on access to review or 
counsel in the criminal law, the federal courts are 
in the position to clarify the emerging issues of 
delivery of legal services in the criminal process. 
Foremost in this clarification should be an in-
sistence that the provision of counsel in the crim-
inal process is a "juridical right" as opposed to a 
"social welfare right." 151 Cast as a juridical right, 
counsel is required whenever the state seeks to 
impose its criniinallabel through prosecution. After 
the prosecution the individual is entitled to at 
least one review with a lawyer to insure the legiti-
147 Cf. United States v. O'Clair, 451 F.2d 485, 486 
(1st Cir. 1971) (holding that appellant is not entitled 
to appointment of different counsel who presumably 
would be willing to serve as mouilipiece for petitioners 
own arguments). 
148 Schnecklotli v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 250, 
{1973) (Powell, J., concurring); See also Friendly, 
Collateral Attack. 
149 Cj. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
160 pACKER, LIMITS at 232-36. 
161 Cappelletti & Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Tltemes 
and Variations, 24 STAN. L. REv. 347 (1972). The au-
iliors suggest iliat in ilie nineteentli century legal aid 
was a combination of juridical right and charity. ld. 
at 387. Legal aid as a juridical right is also present in 
20tli century schemes. One feature of legal aid as a 
juridical right is its emphasis on individual rights and 
responsiblities. As contrasted witli ilie social welfare 
approach, a program of aid as a juridical right "only 
coincidentally attacks problems iliat transcend indi-
vidual interests or capacities." Id. at 393. Cj. E. 
FRIESEN, E. GALLAS & N. GALLAS, MANAGING THE 
CoURTS 49 (N.Y. 1971); Burger, Counsel for t!te Prose-
cution and Defense-Their Roles under t!te Minimmn 
Standards, 8 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 2, 3 (1969). 
macy of state control. Such a delineation is dis-
tinct from the position of some commentators and 
judges who see the right to counsel and access cases 
as part of a social welfare movement.162 
Once the constitutional doctrines of counsel and 
access are seen as juridical rights or matters of 
judicial principles and rules, federal courts are in 
the position to eradicate the differential standards 
between retained and appointed counsel.153 If 
there is one constitutional standard of performance 
of counsel, judicial decisions will be dealing di-
rectly with the troublesome questions of who gets 
what kind of legal services in the criniinal process. 
The line of "indigency" is not a static economic 
level that a rule establishes. For instance, depend-
ing upon one's use of resources for trial counsel, 
one may be indigent for purposes of appeal. Courts 
should not shrink from these troublesome issues 
of the marginal defendants, i.e. those who do not 
meet standards of indigency but cannot afford full 
access to review.154 
Addressing the problems does not mean the 
courts would resolve every issue in terms of 
whether or not the decision favors the indigent. 
Instead the courts should be aware of the alloca-
tive effect of any of its decisions. For example, the 
unresolved issue of whether it is permissible to 
require some form of repayment from those who 
have had counsel appointed in criniinal cases is a 
much broader issue than indigency.155 Appointing 
counsel with little inquiry into true ability to pay 
may make counsel more readily available to all 
those charged with crimes. Bearing in mind that 
this service, at apparent zero cost to the defendant, 
is a cost that must be born by someone, a court 
might determine that a system of recoupment of 
some of the funds is permissible. The degree to 
152 E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 814 (1963); 
Griffin v. lllinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also Bazelon, 
Tlze Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 
1 {1973); Pye, The Administration of Criminal Justice, 
66 CoLUM. L. REv. 286, 301-03 (1966). 
163 Compare West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5tli 
Cir. 1973) (holding ilie standard of effectiveness of 
retained counsel is ilie san1e standard as iliat for ap-
pointed counsel) with United States ex rel. O'Brien v. 
Maroney, 423 F.2d 865 {3d Cir. 1970) (holding iliere is 
a different standard for retained counsel). See gemwally 
Bines, Ineffective Representation at 982. 
154 D. OAXS & W. LERMAN, A CRIMINAL JusTICE 
SYSTEM ANn THE INDIGENT 150-51 (1968). 
166 James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). As tliis 
article was about to go to print, the Court upheld a 
state statute requiring ilie convicted indigent defendant 
to repay ilie cost of counsel when he becan~e financially 
able. Fuller v. Oregon,_ U.S._, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974). 
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which some persons might forego counsel because 
of possible recoupment might be balanced by others 
using the appointed system when their "indigency" 
is in doubt. The foregoing of counsel by some and 
the appointing of counsel where indigency is un-
certain would be desirable if the court thought the 
lawyers operating under its, appointive system were 
better than the average private attorney engaged 
in criminal practice. 
The presence of lawyers throughout the criminal 
process has begun to generate new kinds of public 
policy issues.156 What kinds of controls will most 
likely make the decision-making of lawyers con-
form to the constitutional purposes for requiring 
their presence? Where the appellate court is at-
tempting to control a large public defender or-
ganization, the court would be trying to control a 
bureaucracy, not a disparate group of individual 
lawyers. Mixed systems of appointed private 
lawyers and public defenders are simply variations 
on this theme.157 Providing funds for counsel and 
the organization of the public defender is a legis-
lative response to the judicial creation of the re-
quirement of counsel in the criminal process.163 
The federal appellate court is in a unique posi-
tion to recognize the existence of the new institu-
tion of counsel. As an appellate court it performs 
the function of asking questions of itself and other 
agencies about the criminal law.159 Congress has 
strengthened this role by allowing for the appoint-
ment of a court executive,I6° one of whose functions 
is to engage in research.161 Viewing the federal 
156 John v Hurt, 489 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1973) (per 
curiam) (holding that there is a qualified judicial 
immunity for the public defender); Wallace v. Kern, 
481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied,_ U.S._, 94 S. 
Ct. 879 (1974) (holding that the public defender as an 
association does not act under color of state law for the 
purposes of an injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1970)). The second circuit case may involve a more 
complex issue since the district court judge had ordered 
a certain case load for the legal aid attorneys in New 
York City; Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973). 
m 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (1970). Cj. D. OAKS & W. 
LEimAN, Clm.nNAL JusTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 
at 165. 
lf8 See, United States v. Thompson, 361 F. Supp. 879 
(D.D.C. 1973). Cf. In re Defender Association, 13 
CRIM. L. REP. 2405 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 7 /2/73) {upholding 
city of Philadelphia appointments to board of Defender 
Association which is in part run with city funds). 
159 Bazelon, Ejficimt Courts at 655. 
IEO 28 U.S. C. § 332(e) (1970). 
16128 U.S.C. § 332(e) (6) & (7) provides that the 
court executives' duties may include: "Conducting 
studies relating to the business and administration of 
court's review function in its broadest sense creates 
a new task for the court executive. He must :first 
distinguish the unique features of criminal litiga-
tion in federal courts before he develops overall 
court management policies.162 Professor Packer's 
thesis about the connection of counsel and review 
should be the starting point of his research en-
deavors. As the official researcher, the executive 
must translate Packer's thesis into testable hy-
potheses that relate his management recommenda-
tions to the goal of enforcing the obligation of 
advocacy. Any given federal circuit, as well as the 
circuits together,I63 provide the laboratory for 
testing the probable impact of some legal innova-
tions. 
The series of questions that a court executive 
might ask could begin with a question of court 
management that leads to larger issues of delivery 
of legal services. As to simple methods of docketing 
cases, the executive might ask if the cases are 
categorized in such a way that the various review 
functions of federal courts can be studied sepa-
rately and integrally.164 As to the usual function 
of direct review of criminal convictions, the execu-
tive might ask if various federal districts within 
the circuit have different systems of providing 
counsel.165 If so, a basis of comparison exists for 
testing by some criteria the best way of supplying 
counsel at trial and on direct appeal. If, for in-
stance, over a large number of cases it were found 
that appeals from one federal district took longer, 
or resulted in more reversals than appeals from 
another district, a host of other questions are now 
ready to be addressed. Was the system of appoint-
ing counsel on appeal the same for cases in both 
districts? Or does the make-up and complexion of 
the courts within the circuit .... " and "Collecting, 
compiling, and analyzing statistical data .... " 162 For a characterization of the court executive as 
manager and a description of managerial duties see 
Statement of Ernest Frieson, Jr., Hearings on a Bill to 
Provide for tlze Appointment of an Administrator of tlte 
Courts for Eaclt J1Ulicial Circuit before tlze Smale Sub-
comm. on Improvemmts in Judicial Machinery of t!te 
Committee on lite Jt«liciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., July 
25, 1968, p. 290. See also Statement of Edward C. 
Gallas, Id. at 303 (research projects of the administra-
tor). 163 28 U.S. C. § 331 (1970) (section on Judicial Con-
ference of the United States includes provision for 
making comprehensive survey of U.S. courts). 
m Cf. Haworth, Screming a11tl Smnmary Procedures 
in tlze United States Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 257, 277-79 (1973) (identifying habeas corpus 
actions and distinguishing them from other civil ac-
tions). 
16518 U.S. C. § 3006A(a) (1970). 
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the bar in each district explain the difference? 
What other research would be appropriate in the 
district courts to clarify the problem? And finally, 
what kinds of recommendations, e.g., changes in 
rules of appellate procedure versus the standards 
for effective assistance of counsel are appropriate 
given the kind of research being undertaken?166 
Through a set of similar questions the court 
executive should compare the expenditure of ap-
pellate resources on direct federal criminal appeals 
to the expenditure of resources in collateral review 
of state convictions_Hi7 Once again the problem 
might start with a simple directive to change the 
docketing of cases so that the state of origin of a 
case on collateral attack is readily identifiable. 
More pertinent questions might go to the nature 
of direct review of criminal cases and collateral 
review in the states in the circuit. For instance, 
are there significant differences in the quantity and 
quality of federal review required in states with 
elaborate post-conviction statutes168 as compared 
with those without such provisions? One might 
assume that the state without an elaborate col-
lateral review mechanism generates more work for 
federal courts. But if the state with a minimum 
level of collateral review has an effective system 
of appeals and an effective public defender system, 
the absence of presence of elaborate state col-
lateral attack procedures may not be significant.189 
Such a result would support the overall thesis of 
this article that the time spent on review of crim-
inal convictions in federal courts is a function of 
counsel at the original trial, effectiveness of coun-
sel on appeal, and thus the effectiveness of appel-
late courts. 
A more sophisticated study might include a 
study of the work of another arm of some federal 
appeals court, the prose clerk. The executive might 
examine what happens to those cases that are 
screened out by the pro se clerk. As the official 
166 Statistics will affect the constitutional outcome of 
cases. Cj. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
167 Actions taken under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) are 
not discussed in the article but the analysis would be 
generally applicable. 
168 It might be useful to compare the outcome of 
federal cases originating in a state like New Jersey 
which has only one appeal as a matter of right, see N.J. 
Rules Governing Criminal Practice, Rule 3 :22-3, with 
the outcome of cases originating in Pennsylvania which 
provides counselled collateral attacks on the criminal judgment. See Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 426 Pa. 
226,232 A.2d 629 (1967). 
169 New Jersey appellate courts may have more means 
of insuring vigorous appeals through its inherent rule-
making power. E. FRIESEN, E. GALLAS, & N. GALLAs, 
MANAGING THE COURTS at 31-35. 
researcher, the executive must present his pro-
posed research to the judicial council for pre-
research review. His ability to design his research 
in terms of legal doctrines will increase his impact. 
Furthermore, preview of research by the court 
before it is undertaken will help to determine the 
scope of the executive's recommendations. For 
reasons peculiar to the judges, the court might 
determine that modification of rules might be an 
appropriate goal of research but that legal doc-
trines as to effective assistance of counsel are 
not.170 Realistically, as an arm of the court, the 
executive can only be as innovative as the par-
ticular federal circuit court of appeals that he 
serves. But his overall performance as court mana-
ger will be improved if he recognizes the unique 
features of criminal law in his policy formulations. 
B. "Speedy Dispositions" of Criminat Appeals 
Research, including the process of posing and 
resolving questions, takes time during a period 
when expediting or speeding up the work of appel-
late courts is assumed to be the most important 
common goal. One answer to this objection is to 
simply postulate that time is a commodity input 
of the appellate courts' efficient output in criminal 
law. Deciding how long criminal appeals take will 
ultimately require allocative decisions by appel-
late courts, but a complete answer must go further. 
First, the courts must realize that lawyers and 
judges are more likely to define the issue of "time" 
as the issue of "delay." Given the status of the 
absence of delay in trial as the fundamental right 
to a speedy trial,171 lawyers have every incentive 
to argue that delay on appeal is some type of 
"fundamental individual interest," a violation of 
which would entitle defendants to certain remedies 
from the appellate courts. This tendency will be 
reinforced by the Supreme Court's most recent 
pronouncement that the only remedy available for 
denial of a speedy trial is dismissal of the indict-
ment.172 If this reasoning by analogy173 approach 
17° For reasons peculiar to the judges, they may not 
want to authorize research aimed at modifications of 
difficult constitutional issues involving complex value judgments. See, e.g., Burchard, Lawyers, Political Sci-
entists, Sociologists-and Concealed Microphones, 23 AM. 
SociOLOGICAL REv. 686, 687 in J. KATZ, EXPERIMEN-
TATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 103 (N.Y. 1972). 
171 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Dickey v. 
Florida, 397 U.S. 30 (1970). 
172 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973). 
173 E.g., Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts 
of Appeals: The Threat to tlte Ftmction of Review and 
tlze National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542, 575-76 (1969) 
[hereinafter cited as Carrington, Crowded Dockets]. 
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to the appellate process is adopted, the problem 
for research will be defined as one of "delay." 174 
The solutions proposed will all be similarly aimed 
at eliminating the problem of "delay" or "undue 
delay" that is harmful to some assumed proper 
functioning of appellate courts.175 
However, viewing the issue broadly in terms of 
the different functions of trial and appeals in crim-
inal law, time performs different functions in the 
two aspects of criminal adjudication. At least one 
member of the Supreme Court has indicated that 
the constitutional delay analysis in criminal trials 
is not applicable to the appellate process.176 This 
distinction is of constitutional significance because 
delay at trial interferes with the overall presump-
tion of innocence, 177 which is part of the due process 
analysis of a fair trial. As such, given a particular 
theory of due process of law, a concept of delay of 
trial might be integrated into the notion of a right 
to defend.178 
Time can be defined in terms of appellate func-
tions in criminal law. Such a definition requires 
that the legal presumption for an appellate court 
analysis of the effect of time is the reverse of that 
of the trial court in criminal law. Rather than 
assume that a person is innocent, the appellate 
court is entitled to assume he is guilty. Therefore, 
the primary question for appellate courts is whether 
the convicted appellant has been rightfully con-
victed and is legitimately under the control of 
government officials. Such an articulation of the 
issue clarifies the meaning of legality of guilt de-
termination in tile new emphasis on review of 
criminal convictions. Furthermore, such an em-
phasis on legality in review determinations means 
17f ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS 
3 (1970); Christian, Delay in Criminal Appeals, A 
Fmzctional Analysis of One Court's Work, 23 STAN. L. 
REv. 676 (1971); Fleming, The Law's Delay: Tlze 
Dragotz Slaitt Friday Breathes Fire Agaitz Monday, 32 
PUBLIC INTEREsT 13 (1973); Scwab & Geddes, Ex-
pediting Disposition of Criminal Appeals in Oreg01z, 51 
ORE. L. REv. 650 (1972). Co=ent, Appellate Delay in 
Crimittal Cases, 2 AM. CRm. L.Q. 150 (1964); Note, 
Screettittg of Criminal Cases in tlze Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 73 CoLmr. L. REv. 77 (1973). 
11s I d. 
176 Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 43 n.4 (1970) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
177 See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. at 41 (Brennan, 
J., concurring): "The evils at which the clause is di-
rected are readily identified. It is intended to spare an 
accused those penalties and disabilities-incompatible 
with the presumption of innocence-that may spring 
from delay in the crinlinal process." Cf. Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. at 527 and n.27; In re Winship, 397 
u.s. 358 (1970). 
178 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522-30 (1972). 
tllat appellate courts sometimes pursue goals of 
the criminal law that have nothing to do with the 
individual litigant before it. 
The alleged relationship between "delay" in 
criminal appeal dispositions and the interference 
with other goals of criminal law is minimized by 
determining that the legality of the guilt deter-
mination is to be viewed as the major functio~ 
of criminal appeals. For instance, it is often as-
serted that delay in appellate disposition "dilutes 
deterrence or interferes witll whatever rehabilita-
tive treatment that may be available." 179 The 
assertion is based on two unspoken assumptions 
about how the multiple goals of the criminal law 
are pursued. First, the statement assumes im-
plicitly that review of a criminal conviction does 
not further some important goals of criminal law. 
In this regard the assertion ignores the fact that 
criminal adjudication, including appellate review, 
is tile manner in which the values of the criminal 
law are articulated.180 Second, the statement as-
sumes that whatever penal policy is compromised 
by criminal adjudication is wortll more to the 
appellate courts tllan the time required for review. 
The latter assumption seems particularly un-
warranted since the lack of appellate review of 
sentencing, and thus of penal policy, is what pres-
ently distinguishes sentencing from most other 
criminal law decisions, particularly the determina-
tion of guilt. The effect of time spent on criminal 
appeals on penal policy under present analysis is 
unknown. If appellate courts were to institute 
review of sentencing, the supposed trade-off of 
penal policy and the review of conviction could 
take place in the appellate courts. If the trade-<>ff 
became possible, courts would be producing a new 
product for the criminal process. Whatever time 
the performance of this role required of the appel-
late court would be in production of a different 
output. The older product or output of the appel-
late court had required the reviewing of the guilt 
determination and the work of investigative agents. 
But it is impossible to predict that the total time 
spent on criminal appeals will increase or decrease 
because of the institution of review of sentence.181 
Time expended by an appellate court on crim-
inal appeals of all kinds is time taken from other 
matters. But distinguishing criminal appeals is 
179 Carrington, Crowded Dockets at 576. 
180 Palmer, A Model of Crimittal Dispositions: An 
Alternative to Official Discretion at Sentencing, 62 GEo. 
L.J. 1 (1973). 
181 But see Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 720--21. 
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useful because it allows for identification of the 
options not available for reforming the courts to 
make them produce more. Without complete 
theoretical justification, the fundamental value 
judgment has been made that our criminal process 
needs lawyers and review of guilt determinations.182 
Put another way, lawyers at trial and at least one 
review of a guilt determination with lawyers are 
necessary inputs. 
In judging the time element involved in these 
decisions of :fixed inputs, "indigent appeals" are 
not the problem. While "indigents" surely have 
every incentive to appeal since appeal comes at 
zero cost to them, all defendants have more in-
centives to appeal when the system operates 
basically on a trial plus at least one review. Of 
course some clients will be deterred by lack of 
resources from pursuing some appeals, but in hir-
ing a lawyer's services for a criminal case clients 
increasingly purchase a trial plus review and the 
opportunity for a re-trial.182 The ability to purchase 
the services of an attorney may be an important 
variable in assessing the time spent on review. If 
a lawyer is paid for his services he may have an 
incentive to deliver more than the minimum of a 
trial and one appeal. The paid lawyer may seek 
more appeals in order to make the paying client 
see himself as better off than the non-paying or 
indigent defendant. Or the paid lawyer may have 
an incentive to make maximum use of the appel-
late process dependent upon his client's resources. 
Such incentives may translate into more time 
spent upon appeals by paying clients. However, 
the costs of invoking the process of review may 
not be an important variable in assessing the time 
spent on review. The hypothesis might be tested 
by comparing those states which place a near zero 
monetary cost on invoking the process of review 
by providing every convicted person with a tran-
script and charge no fees to those states that im-
pose direct costs in order to invoke the appellate 
process.184 
Similarly, the option of increasing sentences for 
"frivolous appeals" 185 is probably not available. 
Such a method of internalizing some of the costs 
182 Hazard, Rationing J1estice. It is fixed unless the 
Supreme Court will reexamine Gideon. 
183The defendant is at least trying to gain the bar-
gaining position of a retrial if not outright acquittal. 
184 In California, Massachusetts, and Ohio free tran-
scripts are available to all criminal defendants. CAL. 
Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 69952 (West, Supp. 1973); MAss. 
.ANN. LAWS ch. 278 § 33A (1972) (felonies); Omo Rev. 
CODE Tit. 23, §§ 2301.23, 2301.24, 2301.25 (1955). 
of appeal to the convicted will lead to the due 
process objection that a sentence has been in-
creased solely because of appeaJ.IS6 While a suc-
cessful appellant litigant could not be punished, 
the unsuccessful litigant would. Thus some poten-
tially successful litigants would be deterred from 
appealing by such a system. A second objection 
would be that punishment would be inflicted by 
appellate courts without a legal determination of 
the "crime." In this connection, it is significant 
that appellate courts have not used their rule 
authority to add "damages" to a litigant who pur-
sues a frivolous appeal in criminal cases.!87 By 
their language, the rules might be thought to apply 
to only civil litigation. Courts would find, were 
they to consider the applicability of these rules to 
"criminal" cases, that the punishment of even a 
fine would have been inflicted without a legal de-
termination of guilt. 
The time expended in review of criminal con-
victions becomes a function of defining the prod-
uct of the appellate courts, choosing between the 
available options of inputs, and then measuring 
the output. The most frequent measure of success 
of criminal appeals, reversal rates,lss seems to 
ignore the primary function of appellate courts. 
The convicted litigant or his lawyer will measure 
the output in this manner. The fact ofreversal is ir-
relevant to an appellate court, as a lawmaker in 
many aspects of crim.inallaw. Surely to the judges 
who voted for affirmance, the appeal ended suc-
cessfully. Furthermore, a case that clarifies the 
legal issues in a problem area of the law is a suc-
cess for the court.189 A self-evaluating appellate 
185Hazard, After tlze Trial Court-Tlte Realities of 
Appellate Review in THE CoURTS, THE PuBLic AND THE 
LAW ExPLOSION 60, 84 (1965). 
186 Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973); Stynche-
combe v. Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Colten v. Ken-
tucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); North Carolina v. Pearce, 
395 u.s. 711 (1969). 
187 See, e.g., Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
R.38. Cf. United States ex rel. Boyd v. Rundle, 437 
F.2d 405, 406 (3d Cir. 1970). 
188 Carrington, Crowded Dockets at 578; Haworth, 
Screening and Summary Proced1tres in tlte United States 
Courts of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257, 309-19 
(1973); Hermann, Frivolous Appeals at 706. 
189 United States ex ret. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 
739 (3d Cir. 1972) (en bane). A 7-2 majority's over-
ruling of its prior panel decision in United States v. 
Zeiler, 427 F.2d 130S (3d Cir. 1970), is hardly an 
example of an appellate failure because there was no 
reversal. Of some importance in judging appellate 
success may be the fact that two judges in tlie 3-2-3 
majoritv switched from their own previous position in 
Zeiler Gudges Van Dusen and Adams), 461 F.2d at 
740, 746. But an equally erroneous criterion would be 
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-court must develop measurements related to its 
institutional function. 
The institutional role for federal courts demon-
strates that research aimed at exploring limita-
tions on collateral review is certainly appropriate. 
The option of limiting access to this form of review 
is thus available.190 But any innovation in limiting 
federal review by collateral attack must await 
some careful analysis. The appellate courts should 
also exercise restraint in relying more upon the 
necessary inputs-the lawyers at trial and on 
appeals-to raise issues for appellate decision-
making. An example of this need for judicial re-
straint is the still debated issue of the insanity 
defense. Do lawyers fail to raise the issue as often 
as some appellate judges might like because their 
clients do not perceive the benefit of such de-
fensesi9J or because they ignore an important issue 
of law? The issue of insanity may be symbolically 
extremely important to appellate courts and legal 
scholars because it deals with moral issues in the 
criminal law. But the fact that few lawyer-litigants 
choose to defend on the basis of insanity and few 
appellate advocates raise the issue presents an 
important question for the appellate court: is this 
an issue of law that remains unresolved because of 
legislative unwillingness or inability to answer the 
question of why there is an insanity defense? 192 If 
the answer is in the affirmative, the appellate court 
is starting to articulate its responsibility for the 
"justice" output by leaving such an issue for legis-
lative action or inaction. But the courts might 
have an input into the legislative decision to act 
or not to act by .raising questions about the ad-
ministration of the legislative determination that 
a "mad and bad" syndrome can exist within the 
law.J9J 
The issue of "delay" of appellate dispositions in 
criminal appeals will be raised in this period of 
demands for an efficient judiciary. The appellate 
courts must see that all such alleged issues are 
really functions of larger and more important 
issues. The question of whether "delay" in appel-
that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the majority 
on the point. See Ash v. United States, 413 U.S. 300 
(1973). 
1go Friendly, Collateral Review. 
191 Bazelon, Efficient Courts at 672-73. 
192 Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish tlze Insanity De-
fense-Why Not'/, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Goldstein, 
Tlze Braw11er Rule-Why'/ or 110 More Nonsense on Non-
sense in the Criminal Law, Please!, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 
126 (1973). 
m Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740 (1972). 
late dispositions of a criminal appeal is a reason 
for granting bail194 raises the question of the pur-
poses of bail in general. Should the same criteria 
be used for bail prior to trial versus bail after trial 
pending appeal? A great degree of confidence in 
the effectiveness or "fairness" of criminal trials 
might lead one to argue that no one should be 
entitled to bail pending appeal. After all, a system 
of money bail starts to raise the issue of "indi-
gency"195 and those out on bail have no incentive 
to stop appealing. If lawyers are to be disciplined 
for "delay" in criminal appeals,196 is that because 
the lawyers have violated the standard of advocacy 
in the jurisdiction in failing to pursue the appeal 
expeditiously? If there is delay in state collateral 
attack.,197 is federal habeas corpus appropriate 
because state opportunities to litigate are inade-
quate? If the legislature declares that a certain 
appellate decision must be done within a specified 
time,U8 is an appellate court free to affirm or re~ 
verse automatically if the time period is violated? 
If the government is allowed to appeal certain 
decisions, what criteria will be used to determine 
that the appeal is for "delay" and what sanctions 
follow such a determination? 199 
Time is one of the commodities of input into the 
appellate court's output in criminal law of deter-
mining whether the individual is rightfully con-
victed. The appellate courts must insist that the 
fixed input of counsel at trial spend its time de-
fending against the charge and that other fixed 
input of counsel on appeal spend its time seeking 
at least one review based on the defense made out 
at trial. Such an approach starts to reward those 
appellate lawyers who successfully follow the de-
1M See, e.g., Rivera v. Concepcion, 469 F.2d 17 (1st 
Cir. 1972). Contra, State ex rei. Mastriani v. Tahash, 
277 Minn. 309, 152 N.W.2d 786 (1967) (three year 
delay on habeas corpus petition-petitioner serving life 
sentence for first degree murder). 
195 PACKER, LIMITS at 216-217. 
196 United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 
1970). 
197 Duke v. State, _ Ind. _, 298 N.E.2d 453 (1973) 
(held that 2~2 year delay deprived the defendant of a 
prompt appeal); Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 
1971) (held that petitioner is entitled to a speedy pro-
bation revocation hearing). But see Mastriani v. Tahash, 
277 Minn. 309, 152 N.W.2d 786 (1967). 
198 See, e.g., 28 U.S. C. § 1826(a) & (b) (1970) (federal 
recalcitrant witness statute provides that an appeal 
from an order of confinement must be disposed of 
within thirty days). 
199 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (amended 1971) provides in 
part: "An appeal by the United States shall lie ... from 
a decision or order ... suppressing ... evidence ... if 
the United States attorney certifies to the district court 
that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay .... " 
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fense strategy as opposed to those who raise issues 
not used in defense of the criminal charge. Award-
ing this type of appellate strategy is necessary 
to prevent the institutional defense services from 
rationing justice. Without such appellate court 
control there exists the possibility that the defender 
organizations are trading invisibly time spent on 
individual appeals for time on "significant" or 
"winning issues." But more important is the need 
to examine the impact of the institutional de-
fense counsel in the criminal process to determine 
whether criminal appeals are part of the invisible 
form of the "bargain model" of the criminal pro-
cess.200 
200 It may well be that the specialization in the 
various stages of a criminal proceeding which is 
made possible by the vast volume of cases which 
comes to the Voluntary Defender's office promotes 
efficiency and provides expert service .... These 
twin qualities of ~e divisions of labor and spt;cial-
ization are the pillars of the large modem pnvate 
law firm. On the other hand, in such an institu-
tionalized system there are inherent the risks of a 
loss of the close confidential relationship between 
litigant and counsel and the subordination of an 
individual client's interest to the larger interest of 
the organization. These risks of course are greater 
in the case of indigents for whose clientele there is 
no compensating pressure of competition. United 
States v. Moore, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (1970). 
See also United States ex rel. McCoy v. Rundle, 
419 F.2d 118, 119-20 (1969) (Freeman, J., concurring). 
Cj. Co=ent, Client Ser<!ice in a Defender Organization: 
The Philadelplria Experience, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 448, 
468-69 (1969). 
Conclttsion 
Legal scholars cannot ignore the demand for 
more efficient courts by claiming that law or jus-
tice is not rationed. They must join the debate 
on judicial administration by explaining the poli-
cies of the law that create the apparent conflict 
with the goal of more efficient courts. This exam-
ination of the implications of the right of counsel 
and access to review cases is a portion of the over-
all debate. A second obligation of legal scholarship 
is to develop through legal analysis testable hy-
potheses that researchers in other disqplines can 
use in their decisions about courts and related 
institutions. In this regard, it should be noted that 
certain kinds of data about the operation of courts 
will be gathered because of the legislatively defined 
research functions of federal court executives. 
Thus, the second goal of this article has been to 
offer some suggestions for research that should 
enable courts, court administrators, evaluators of 
courts, and the providers of counsel in criminal law 
to allocate the resources that society is devoting to 
criminal law administration. And finally this 
article has demonstrated that the alleged problem 
of "delay" in at least criminal appeals is a matter 
of determining what are the fixed and variable 
inputs of the appellate courts' product or function 
in criminal law. "Delay" in criminal appeals is a 
matter of identifying the variable input of time in 
criminal law litigation. 
